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NUMBER 2

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
CONFINING AND CONTROLLING ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION
WITHIN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
CHARLES H. KOCH*

A study of administrative law is largely an examination of the confining and controlling of administrative discretion. Until fairly recently, this
study was limited to examination of quasi-judicial procedures and control of
quasi-judicial decisions through judicial review. Yet much of the exercise of
discretion falls outside the quasi-judicial agency functions. Consequently,
scrutiny of a wider range of discretionary processes is essential.
In the past, movement in this direction was inhibited by an unrealistic
assumption against the propriety of administrative discretion. Great strides
in dealing with discretion were possible only after theorists recognized that
discretion is necessary to the successful functioning of our system. Efforts to
completely eliminate discretion are fruitless and must fail. We now recognize that to cope with discretion we must first admit the need for it and try to
understand its exercise so that it can be confined and controlled where doing
so will in fact, not in theory, improve the services the government renders
its citizens.
Advocates of controlling discretion rely in varying degrees on the
courts as an instrument for achieving the necessary reforms. Because judicial courts can only react retrospectively to the cases presented to them and
the courts can handle only a limited number of cases, the best hope for
effective reform may be in legislative or administrative action. Judicial
review does serve, however, to stimulate reform. For example, discussion
of court action impacts on congressional and administrative handling of
discretionary justice problems. Consequently, while the real solution to
* Assistant Professor of Law, DePaul University; LL.M., University of Chicago; J.D.,
George Washington University; member of the Illinois bar.
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most discretionary justice problems may lie in legislative or executive
action, discussions, such as this one, which concentrate on the potential role
of the judiciary in confining or controlling discretion can contribute to
solutions.
Courts have been somewhat reluctant to embark into the less charted
areas of administrative action. Part of the reason for this must lay with the
failure of practitioners to gain the sophisticated understanding of administrative law necessary to make adequate presentations. But a great deal of the
cause has to rest on the administrative law theorists and teachers who have
not given courts or practitioners the necessary guidance.
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis offers the most help in this area. Indeed,
the subject matter would be a great deal poorer but for him. He raised
interest with his book on discretionary justice,' and, since that book, he has
continued to push for study of informal and discretionary action. 2 His
general plan would structure the exercise of discretion through open plans,
open policy statements, open rules, open findings, open reasons, open
precedents and fair informal procedure, and would check discretion through
official supervision whereby one officer would check another.' Substantial
contributions made by several commentators 4 and greater involvement by
the judiciary 5 has resulted in important analytical development in recent
years.
In the last year, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has
explored the problems of administrative discretion. Often, its approach has
been sophisticated. As a result, it has become one of the leaders in developing useful techniques for confining and controlling discretion.
Discretion exercised in informal adjudicatory-type administrative action has puzzled the judiciary and commentators alike and, hence, a good
deal of difficult law has been made in the seventies about procedures for
informal agency adjudication. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
is among those courts which continually examine the problem of structuring
1. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969).
2. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 4.08-3 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as DAVIS SEVENTIES]; K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 4.13-4.22 (Supp. 1970)
[hereinafter cited as DAVIS SUPP. 1970].
3. DAVIS SUPP. 1970, supra note 2, at §§ 4.14-4.18.

4. The Administrative Conference of the United States has produced several studies on
the exercise of discretion in the administrative agencies. See generally ADMIN. CONF. OF THE
U.S., RECOMMENDATIONS

AND REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED

STATES (1968-1976); Clagett, Informal Action-Adjudication-Rule making: Some Recent Developments in Federal Administrative Law, 1971 Duke L.J. 51; Sofaer, Judicial Control of
Informal Discretionary Adjudication and Enforcement, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1293 (1972).
5. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, for example, has played a significant
role in the development of administrative law, as this article will demonstrate.
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informal adjudicatory action, and it has contributed valuable thinking
concerning the myriad problems involved with the notion of "some kind of
hearing" for informal adjudication. 6 In addition, the Seventh Circuit has
worked to check the growth of unnecessary discretion by insisting that
agencies follow their own precedent and rules or explain why they chose to
deviate from prior policies. By requiring consistency in informal action,
unnecessary discretion will be further limited. More important is the
Seventh Circuit's continued use of required rule-making as a remedy for too
much delegated discretion. Required rule-making assigns the agencies,
rather than the courts or the legislatures, the task of building the boundaries
around broad discretion. The notion of judicially required rule-making is
one of the most important developments in the effort to confine and control
discretion and the Seventh Circuit has been, and continues to be, a leader in
the growth of this practical technique for limiting unnecessary discretion.
Because of the Seventh Circuit's advanced work in all of these areas of
administrative discretion, the discussion below is more than a review of
recent cases; it is an analysis of the circuit's recent contributions to the
development and implementation of the several techniques for assuring
discretionary justice in the administrative process.
STRUCTURING ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION: PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS
IN INFORMAL ADJUDICATION

Discretionary action may take numerous forms of which informal
adjudication7 is only one. While more numerous than formal adjudication,
informal adjudication is a small portion of all discretionary action, 8 but its
direct impact on citizens' lives makes it a most important type of discretionary action. Recently, a great deal has been said about structuring discretion
6. See generally Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267 (1975).
7. Informal adjudication, in a general way, refers to discretionary action related to a
specific individual or group taken without formalized procedures. It increasingly represents a
type of informal exercise of discretion for which some formality, short of trial-type procedure,
may be profitably considered.
The term 'informal adjudication' has no commonly accepted meaning. . . .[lit broadly refers to administrative decisions that are not governed by statutory procedures, but
which nevertheless affect an individual's rights, obligations, or opportunities. Perhaps
it is easier to say what the term does not mean. It does not mean rulemaking, either
formal or informal under section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act. Nor does it
mean formal adjudication, as defined either by sections 554, 556, and 557 of the APA
or by organic agency legislation that establishes comparable procedure formality. A
key indicium of formality in this context is the presence of an administrative law judge
as the presiding official. In essence, informal adjudication is a residual category of
procedural entitlement that grows or diminishes in 'formality' more by judicial and
administrative notions of fairness than by legislative plan or design.
Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 739 n. I (1976).
8. DAVIS SuPP. 1970, supra note 2, at § 4.13; see Gardner, The Procedures By Which
Informal Action Is Taken, 24 AD. L. REV. 155, 156 (1972).
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when exercised through informal adjudication. 9 The Supreme Court of the
United States and the other federal courts continue to struggle with the
complex problem of devising the right level of formality in each of the
10
myriad informal adjudicative activities.
Like all other federal courts, the Seventh Circuit has had to apply the
amorphous Supreme Court law on informal adjudication to specific cases. I"
The question of proper informal procedures lies on the periphery of several
recent Seventh Circuit opinions.1 2 The Seventh Circuit continues its exploration of the problem of damage liability for violation of due process in the
exercise of discretion in informal adjudicative situations.1 3 It also offered
some guidance as to when an agency has statutory authority to choose
informal adjudication over formal adjudication. 4

9. Numerous important scholarly contributions have been produced recently. Among the
most useful are Friendly, supra note 6; Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus
for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factorsin Search of a Theory of
Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28 (1976); Rabin, Job Security and Due Process: Monitoring
Administrative Discretion Through a Reasons Requirement, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 60 (1976);
Verkuil, supra note 7.
10. Mashaw, supra note 9, at 28 n.l.
II. The Seventh Circuit also considered formal adjudication during the last term. Relying
on Atlas Roofing Co. v. OccupationalSafety & Health Review Comm'n, 97 S. Ct. 1261 (1977)
the court held that Congress could assign an agency the task of adjudicating health and safety
violations without providing for trial by jury. Penn-Dixie Steel Corp. v. Occupational Safety &
Health Review Comm'n, 553 F.2d 1078, 1080 (7th Cir. 1977).
The Seventh Circuit also reasserted that private contract principles do not apply to
government consent settlement agreements and, hence, a respondent cannot withdraw from a
settlement agreement even though the agency has not finally accepted a proposed consent
order. Johnson Products Co. v. FTC, 549 F.2d 35, 38 (7th Cir. 1977).
In United States Steel Co. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822 (.7th Cir. 1977), the Seventh Circuit found
considerable flexibility in the formal procedures required by the Administrative Procedure Act.
An initial decision from the employee presiding at the hearing is not required for "applications
for initial licenses," 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(A) (1970), or where "the agency requires, either in
specific cases or by general rule, the entire record to be certified to it for decision." 5 U.S.C. §
557(b) (1970). 556 F.2d at 834-35. The court also found that one seeking a permit was the
"proponent of a rule or order" and must bear the burden of proof under the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1970). 556 F.2d at 834.
In Allen v. Weinberger, 552 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1977), the court found that expert consultant
opinion based on medical reports rather than examination was not inadmissible hearsay, but
should be given little weight in arriving at the decision. But see text accompanying notes 97-101
infra.
In Squillacote v. Teamsters Local 344, 561 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1977), the Seventh Circuit
explored in depth the exception to the exhaustion doctrine. The case actually involves the
related problem of when access to district court is permitted where the statute requires direct
appeal of final order to the court of appeals. The decision takes a very narrow view of the
exception. A district court is, of course, the appropriate forum to challenge an agency subpoena.
12. One case, Hathway v. Mathews, 546 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1976), offered a particularly
valuable opportunity for the court to delve into the problems of informal adjudication. See text
accompanying notes 57-69 infra.
13. See text accompanying notes 108-25 infra.
14. See text accompanying notes 126-57 infra.
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When are ProceduresRequired for Informal Adjudication?
The Seventh Circuit, along with the entire federal judiciary, 15 has been
wrestling with the new developments in the law of informal adjudication.
Goldberg v. Kelly 16 is generally conceded to be the antecedent to the great
mass of inquiries into what procedures are required in informal adjudicative
procedures.
Goldberg marked the initiation of a trend to extend the application of
due process requirements into the area of executive and administrative
action which had been the exclusive domain of adminstrators exercising
unstructured discretion. 17 Goldberg compels courts to look at a seemingly
infinite variety of informal action to determine whether more formality is
required. Because of that case, a great experiment has been undertaken to
examine when fairness and feasibility combine to indicate new procedural
prescriptions.1 8 These inquiries have brought about a due process explosion
as the entire federal judiciary is laboring to find order after the cataclysmic
decision in Goldberg.
Goldberg involved state termination of public assistance payments
19
without an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing prior to termination.
Justice Brennan, speaking for the Supreme Court, stated "that the pretermination hearing need not take the form of a judicial or quasi-judicial
trial." 20 However, the Supreme Court imposed a plethora of evidentiary
type procedures on the pre-termination decision-making process. 21 In holding that these public aid recipients were entitled to what amounted to an
evidentiary hearing, the Supreme Court relied on a characterization of
welfare benefits as something approaching a property right: "a matter of
statutory entitlement." '22 The Court seemed to find that this entitlement
necessitated some due process safeguards before the benefits could be taken.
"The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the recipient
is influenced by the extent to which he may be 'condemned to suffer
15. Friendly, supra note 6, at 1273; Mashaw, supra note 9, at 28 n.l.
16. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
17. Mashaw, supra note 9, at 29; Verkuil, supra note 7, at 739; Note, ProceduralDue
Process: After Goss v. Lopez, 1976 DUKE L.J. 409, 411.
18. The Administrative Conference has also been working to examine the problem of
whether more procedures for informal action should be required. See Clagett, supra note 4, at
63-64; Gardner, supra note 8, at 163-64.
19. The state, subsequent to the filing of the suit, adopted informal procedures which
included a conference with a caseworker, supervision, a statement of reasons for termination
and the right to higher level administrative review. In addition, a denied claimant could seek an
evidentiary-type hearing after termination.
20. 397 U.S. at 266.
21. Id. at 266-71.
22. Id. at 262.
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grievous loss' . . . and depends upon whether the recipient's interest in
avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental interest in summary adjudication." 2 3 The Court suggested a balancing of interests. It found that the
costs of losing the minimal level of sustenance provided under the program
outweighed the additional expense that would be imposed on the government by requiring additional procedural safeguards. 24
In this case, the Supreme Court pushed for "some kind of hearing" in
a number of discretionary situations. 25 While the 1973 term showed some
pull back, the 1974 term brought resumed development. 26 There no longer
can be any exercise of administrative discretion which is beyond procedural
scrutiny. Some formality may be added to any informal discretionary action .27
Despite the quantity of Supreme Court pronouncements, there is no
clear standard for the imposition of some procedures on administrative
discretion. The inquiry usually begins with the question of whether due
process is required in a particular decision-making process and then, where
28
required, what is the requisite process necessary to meet that standard.
The first analysis of whether due process is required begins with the
theoretical qualification that the requirements of procedural due process
apply only to deprivations of "life, liberty, or property" protected by the
fifth and fourteenth amendments. New notions of protected liberty and
property, however, infinitely expand the potential application of the doctrine. At one time a distinction was drawn between those governmental
and those characterized as
benefits characterized as "rights"
"privileges.'"29 Due process guarantees were held not to apply to depriva23. Id. at 262-63.
24. Id. at 266. Balancing individual interest against governmental or community interests
is one of the doctrinal concepts derived from this case and others. For a valuable discussion of
this concept, see Note, Specifying the ProceduresRequired by Due Process: Toward Limits on
the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1510 (1975).
25. Friendly, supra note 6, at 1273-74.
26. Id. at 1274.
27. Another question which pervades these cases is whether a hearing must precede the
final discretionary determination:
One line suggested a presumption in favor of prior evidentiary hearings: The deprivation of any substantial interest prior to an opportunity for hearing would have to be
justified by some reasonably compelling governmental necessity. The other line
seemed to reverse that presumption: summary process that preliminarily disposed of
property or other interests was acceptable, provided there was later opportunity for a
hearing that might lead to a reinstatement of the interest.
Mashaw, supra note 9, at 36-37.
28. E.g., Coppenbarger v. Federal Aviation Administration, 558 F.2d 836, 839 (7th Cir.
1977).
29. E.g., Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 451 (1954) (practice of medicine is a
privilege); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) (admission of
aliens to U.S. is a privilege). See generally DAvis Supp. 1970, supra note 2, at §§ 7.11-7.13; Van
Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-PrivilegeDistinctionin Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV.
1439 (1968).
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tions of privileges, on the theory that the government had a free hand in
denying benefits which were mere "privileges." Recently, the Supreme
Court has heeded critics of this distinction and refused to deny appropriate
procedures in cases which might well involve traditional privileges. 30 Resolution of the due process question no longer depends on this distinction.
Indeed, the class of protected property interests extends well beyond actual
ownership of legal property and the class of protected liberty interests
beyond mere freedom from overt restraint.3 The analysis of when more
formalized procedures are necessary for informal adjudication looks to new
definitions of liberty rights and property rights.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Board of Regents v. Roth32 serves as a
foundation for defining protected liberty interests. The case involved the
firing of an assistant professor at a state school. Since the professor had
taught only one year, and did not have tenure, his reappointment was left to
the "unfettered discretion" of university officials. The Court found that the
respondent was not deprived of procedural due process because he did not
show deprivation of liberty or property protected by the fourteenth amendment. The Court analyzed both the liberty interest and the property interest.
As to the liberty interest, the Court found that minimal requirements of due
process must be satisfied "where a person's good name, reputation, honor,
33
or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him."
This language, and the holdings of other cases, substantially expanded the
perimeter of liberty interest beyond the historical meaning of the term. The
cases delineate two situations in which harm to a person's liberty interest
requires due process safeguards:
(1)where the government has made charges against the individual
which might seriously damage his standing and associations within
his community, or which threatens his good name, reputation,
honor, or integrity, and (2) where the state imposes a stigma or
other disability upon the individual that forecloses his34 freedom to
take advantage of future employment opportunities.
35
Harm to these liberty interests must be "serious.''
Property interest has given rise to a more sophisticated application of
Goldberg principles. A comparison of Roth with a case based on similar
facts, Perry v. Sindermann,36 indicates a boundary between protected and
30. E.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471,482 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535,539 (1971); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365, 374 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
31. Note, supra note 17, at 412.
32. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
33. Id. at 573.
34. Note, supra note 17, at 420.
35. Id.

36. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).

282
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unprotected property interests. Both cases involved the dismissal of nontenured teachers. In Perry, however, the Court refused to permit nonretention without first affording some kind of procedures. The Court found
in Perry a de facto tenure system. Sindermann had more than Roth's mere
expectancy of employment. Because of the de facto tenure, Sindermann's
interest had ripened into a property interest in his job which could be
terminated only for cause. Rules and understandings officially promulgated
by the college gave Sindermann a legitimate claim of entitlement to job
tenure.3" This entitlement demanded some procedural safeguards.38 As the
Court said, in refusing to impose procedures in Roth: "To have a property
interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need
or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation .
39
must . . . have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it."

.

.

. He

Employment has been the one area where the concept of property
interest has taken the firmest hold. Shifting the analysis from examining the
usefulness of procedures to defining property interests has undermined an
entire line of job security cases.' Recently, in Bishop v. Wood, 4 ' the
Supreme Court relied on distinguishing property interest from the absence of
property interest to permit termination of employment without procedures.
Bishop was dismissed from the city police after three years because the chief
of police claimed he had failed to discharge his duties properly. The
dismissal came after a conference with the chief and the city manager. At no
time was he given an evidentiary hearing. In upholding the dismissal, the
Supreme Court distinguished Arnett v. Kennedy,42 a prior case in which it
required procedural safeguards. In doing so, the Court stated that:
In [Arnett] the Court concluded that because the employee could
only be discharged for cause, he had a property interest which was
entitled to constitutional protection. In [Bishop], a holding that as
a matter of state law the employee 'held his position at the will and
pleasure of43the city' necessarily establishes that he had no property interest.
These cases exemplify the regressive process which has destroyed the
promise of Goldberg. The genius of the Goldberg decision is not its
individual holding but its focus on the need to impose procedural safeguards
in informal actions. The recent line of entitlement cases eschews flexibility
for "once a property interest was established the inquiry into what process
37. Id. at 601-02.
38. See generally Comment, Entitlement, Enjoyment, and Due Process of Law, 1974
DUKE L.J. 89 for a discussion and criticism of the entitlement doctrine.
39. 408 U.S. at 577.
40. Rabin, supra note 9, at 73.
41. 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
42. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
43. 426 U.S. at 345 n.8.
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was due developed variations on a single theme: the adjudicatory hearing
model. "44

Nowhere is this inflexible approach more destructive than in employment cases. The inquiry should avoid definitional analysis of what constitutes a property interest and proceed, instead, toward assurance of some
procedures in many more situations . 5 Attention must not be diverted from
the crucial question: due process is always required for all administrative
action and, hence, the search should be for the process in each exercise of
discretion which will be fair not only to the individual or group directly
involved but also the entire populace. While many opinions focus undue
attention in interest definition, the Supreme Court has often analyzed the
problem in terms of the appropriateness of additional procedures.
In Mathews v. Eldridge,46 the majority opinion articulates a set of
criteria with a comprehensiveness that suggests a preliminary integration of
the Court's recent efforts to impose additional procedures. 4 7 The case arose
from the Social Security Administration's affirmance of a state agency's
finding that Eldridge was no longer disabled, resulting in termination of
disability benefits. The administrative decision was the result of an informal
investigation and a brief statement of reason was provided. Nonetheless,
Eldridge argued that he could not get a proper airing of his claim except at
an oral hearing before an impartial hearing official. An overwhelming
majority upheld the Social Security Administration's termination procedure.
The generalized criteria agreed upon by the entire Supreme Court would
have a court consider:
first, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.4 8
According to these criteria a court must first weigh the extent of the
private interest involved. This process is very subjective and impressionistic. 49 An example is the Court's own effort to distinguish Eldridge from the
welfare recipients protected by Goldberg on the grounds that Goldberg had
involved an income maintenance scheme of last resort for those in financial
44. Rabin, supra note 9, at 75.
45. See Rabin, supra note 9, at 77.
46. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
47. Mashaw, supra note 9, at 29. Professor Mashaw suggests that the case also marks the
point at which the court began to avoid "balancing" analysis by finding the due process clause
inapplicable. Id. at 29 n.5.
48. 424 U.S. at 335.
49. Mashaw, supra note 9, at 39.
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made payneed, while the Social Security disability system in Eldridge
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necessity.
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The second factor, value of additional procedural safeguards, raises the
crucial question. 51 The Court determined that additional or alternative procedure, particularly oral presentation or evidentiary hearing, would add little
to the determination. The decision before the agency was essentially technical fact-finding. For such decisions, accuracy and veracity could be guaranteed by the investigatory procedures used by the agency. The written
procedures were well designed; they provided reasons for tentative decisions and an opportunity to submit additional written evidence. 52 Nonetheless, for some reason, face-to-face contact with the decision-maker seems to
make a substantial difference in the outcome of such cases. The Supreme
Court was troubled by the high reversal rate where there were agency
reconsiderations after a hearing. Professor Mashaw suggests that, in this
context, accuracy may be meaningless and consistency at least unachievable; hence, "[oral hearing] may make sense precisely because accuracy
and consistency are so elusive in this system." 53 The subjective nature of
the decision suggests to him procedures which increase the input of intangibles. Yet, the high reversal rate does not necessarily demonstrate that
hearing officers are more just; they may merely be more lenient. A just
system may demand less subjective decisions, unaffected by psychological
drives to bestow charity on a particular individual with whom the decisionmaker is made to empathize by personal contact.5 4 Community interests are
cheated by decisions which grant money to the undeserving. Funds available
to the needy will be depleted by useless evidentiary proceedings. Overall
justice may lie in permitting abbreviated procedures where, as here, such
procedures are not demonstrably incompetent.
Therefore, the third consideration, public interest, becomes exceedingly important, not only to the generalized interests, but to the particular
interests the system is attempting to help. A court must consider both the
costs of making additional procedures available and the money and psychological costs of bestowing benefits on ineligible recipients. Increasingly, we
are being made aware of the fact that public funds are not infinite. 55 The key
question is how to optimize the impact of the finite and relatively scarce
50. 424 U.S. at 340-41. The Court does acknowledge in Goldberg that the "degree of
difference can be overstated." Id. at 341.
51. See text accompanying notes 70-96 infra.
52. See Coppenbarger v. Federal Aviation Administration, 558 F.2d 836, 840 (7th Cir.
1977).
53. Mashaw, supra note 9, at 45.
54. Face to face contact with the decisionmaker substantially enhances a welfare recipient's chances. Id. at 43.
55. Friendly, supra note 6, at 1276.
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resource, monies transferred from the harried middle class to the economically disadvantaged. Maximized social welfare must pervade judicial procedural decisions; fine tuning individual decisions can do substantial harm if
overall impact is ignored.5 6
In an exceedingly important and useful Seventh Circuit opinion,
Hathaway v. Mathews,"7 Judge Swygert conducted a search for the right
blend of fairness to the individual and furtherance of the general public
good. The case involved a very loaded fact situation. The Department of
Health, Education and Welfare 58 terminated Medicaid benefits allocated for
patients in Ms. Hathaway's nursing home because it found that the home did
not comply with federal health and safety standards. Funds paid to her
patients were cut off without first affording her notice and any sort of
hearing. Apparently, the grievance asserted that the nursing home had no
sprinkler system.5 9 HEW never clarified that point even at oral argument. 6°
While the defect was discovered by an inspection team, the HEW inspectors
did not inform Ms. Hathaway of the deficiency. Instead, HEW informed the
state agency which in turn notified Ms. Hathaway. She contended that
benefits to her patients could not be terminated without notice to her of
specific violations and an opportunity to rebut HEW's allegation at a
hearing. HEW's position was that even if a hearing must be held, it need not
be a pre-termination hearing. On the procedural issue, the district court
found that any due process requirement could be satisfied by the post61
termination hearing.
The court of appeals held that as long as the home complied with state
and federal requirements, Medicaid payments to its residents is a protected
property right under the due process clause. 62 The implications of this
holding are that the health and safety requirements provide the government
with the authority to discontinue its obligation on the one hand and provide
the recipient with the basis for demanding some procedural protection on the
other. Had entitlement to the benefits somehow been solely at the whim of
the government, as in Roth and Bishop, perhaps no procedural protection
56. Professor Mashaw offers an abstract value oriented system as the proper calculus for
prescribing procedures in administrative adjudication. Mashaw, supra note 9, at 46-57.
57. 546 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1976).
58. Hereinafter referred to as HEW.
59. See 546 F.2d at 231 n.4.
60. Id. at 230.
61. Id. at 228. The district court also found that Hathaway could not seek a remedy
against the federal agency because her relationship was with the state. The circuit court found
that this argument exalted "legal formalism over reality." Id. at 229. It refused to ignore the
fact that HEW's action would force her out of business. The circuit court also found that there
were no state remedies to exhaust because the state was ready to pay the Medicaid benefits, but
for the federal action. Id. at 229-30.
62. Id. at 230.
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would be available. The court confidently found that this situation fell
within the "long line of cases" 63 finding sufficient property interest to reach
one protection of the due process clause, for the statute created an expectation which could not be withdrawn without notice and hearing. 64 The
interest was of the variety for which a post-termination hearing was not
sufficient protection:
In determining whether a hearing must be afforded before a statutory entitlement can be removed, we must balancethe interests of
the Government in protecting the health and safety of the Home's
residents and the integrity of the Medicaid program against Hathaway's interests in not having the flow of Medicaid payments
interrupted while she waits for her hearing.
Where the deprivation to the individuals affected by the removal
of a governmental benefit is this severe, the Government's asserted interest must be65 pressing to justify postponing the hearing until
after termination.
The facts did not support the agency's contention that there was an
imminent health and safety danger. After all, the court said, if there were a
danger, why did the agency wait three months.66 Thus, there were no time
constraints compelling expediated termination.
The fact situation in this case prohibits a result oriented procedural
decision. The court was required to tread through several public policy
dilemmas and its predicament here exemplifies the practical problem with
procedural innovation in the area of informal adjudication. The rights of a
nursing home operator had to be balanced against the ability of the government to protect very helpless citizens. The need for pre-termination procedure had to be balanced against the prospect that other nursing home
operators will use the law to delay compliance with minimal standards, and
to bargain insistence on burdensome procedures for compromise as to health
and safety.67 The cost of the procedures had to be weighed against the
benefit which might accrue. Finally, the court had to remember that a
pronouncement which might be fair in this individual case may make law
which will be neither useful nor fair to the real interest to be protected: those
63. See 546 F.2d at 230.
64. Id. at 230-31.
65. Id. (emphasis added). For criticism of the balancing approach see Note, Speciflying
the Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1510 (1975).
66. 546 F.2d at 231.
67. See Hamilton, Proceduresfor the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability: The
Need for ProceduralInnovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CAL. L. REV. 1276, 1289-90
(1972) (formal rule-making); Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" under the Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal and EmpiricalAnalysis, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 401, 443 (1975) (trial procedure
for informal rule-making).
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legitimately in need of Medicaid. The balance, the court decided, tipped in
favor of some kind of hearing before termination.
Since some sort of minimal level of procedural fairness had not been
attained in Hathaway, the Seventh Circuit needed only to suggest techniques which may have served. For this reason, the opinion is somewhat
deficient as to the truly important question: what type of hearing is necessary. The court seems to envision an evidentiary type hearing with an
impartial fact finder. Yet, procedural fairness may have been attained
merely by providing for an informal conference before termination. On this
basis, it distinguished Case v. Weinberger68 where the termination was
upheld because of such a pre-termination conference. The court suggested
that mere notice might have avoided the entire controversy, and a statement
69
of reasons accompanying proposed termination may have sufficed.
ProceduralRequirements for a Valid Hearing
The crucial and difficult determination is what kind of procedure
should be required for any given form of informal agency action. Myopic
70
commitment to a trial-type hearing has stunted development in this area.
Greater flexibility in procedural alternatives should replace the definitional
analysis requiring a choice between full trial procedures and no formal
procedures for a hearing. Despite the Supreme Court's numerous admonishments in favor of flexibility, 7' the commitment to procedural flexibility is
largely illusory.72
There is little excuse, except for simple traditionalism, for this lack of
vision. Judge Friendly has provided an encyclopedic reference on the
strengths and weaknesses of the various elements of procedure. 73 If judges
could escape the strictures of the judicial model, they could use this tool to
prescribe the elements of procedure which will serve a particular decision-

68. 523 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1975). See also Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for
Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (where the Supreme Court found that a procedure
which provided for preremoval conference at which counsel can object to removal). The
interplay of rights--child's, parent's, foster parent's and community's-in the Smith case is
exceedingly interesting.
69. 546 F.2d at 231 n.4. The agency's failure to communicate its complaints in Hathaway
stands in stark contrast with the agency's methods approach in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976). Mashaw, supra note 9, at 41.
70. See Rabin, supra note 9, at 75. But see Mashaw, supra note 9, at 54.
71. E.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 560 (1974); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471,481 (1972). See generally Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971); Hannah v. Larche,
363 U.S. 420 (1960).
72. Rabin, supra note 9, at 75.
73. Friendly, supra note 6, at 1277-1304.
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making problem. Crafting new "tests" for imposing trial procedures
is an
74
unproductive, and often detrimental, game of legal semantics.
In Goss v. Lopez, 75 the Supreme Court attempted to set forth realistically modeled procedures. That case involved a student who was suspended
from public school for ten days without a hearing. Full trial, even very
limited adversary processes, would have been inappropriate, counter-productive and unduly expensive for all concerned. Yet, the Supreme Court
would not permit irresponsible administrative action to stand merely for
want of the imagination necessary to look beyond forensic methods. The
Supreme Court said that school officials could not dismiss a student even for
ten days without providing some process by which the decision could be
tested. Even so minor a disciplinary action is not within absolute administrative discretion. In defining what procedures are required, the Supreme Court
showed sensitivity to the unique problems inherent in a school setting.
Rather than requiring the school to follow a judicial model, the Court stated
that the principal must provide the kind of process that a fair-minded
principal would require under similar circumstances. 7 6 After articulating its
concern for the practical problems of school discipline, the Court stated:
[D]ue process requires . . . that the student be given oral or
written notice of the charges against him and, if he denies them, an
explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his side of the story. The Clause requires at least
these rudimentary precautions against unfair or mistaken findings
of misconduct and arbitrary exclusion from school.
In holding as we do, we do not believe that we have imposed
procedures on school disciplinarians which are inappropriatein a
classroom setting. Instead we have imposed requirements which
are, if anything, less than a fair-minded school principal would
impose upon himself in order to avoid unfair suspensions.
Brief disciplinary suspensions are almost countless. To impose in
each such case even truncated trial-type procedures might well
overwhelm administrative facilities in many places and, by diverting resources, cost more than it would save in educationaleffectiveness. Moreover, further formalizing the suspension process
• . 7.7[may] destroy its effectiveness as part of the teaching process.
Consequently, the Supreme Court mitigated the dilemma of balancing the
harm to the individual against detriment to functional effectiveness by
74. Anxiety over keeping manageable the "right" to some kind of hearing rather than
weighing the functional advantages of some procedures has driven the Supreme Court to set too
high a threshold at which the right accrues. See Rabin, supra note 9, at 76.
75. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
76. Id. at 583.
77. Id. at 581-83 (emphasis added).

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

289

procedural imagination and flexibility.
A conceptual base for determining what procedures are necessary rests
on three elements: fairness, efficiency and satisfaction to participants. 78
These three values must interact. Where satisfaction to participants dominates, as in Goldberg, 79 the process will be unduly cluttered with procedures. Too much procedure can be as harmful as too little.8 0 If efficiency
dominates, procedures will be insufficient to assure accuracy and equity.
Thus, what is needed is a methodology for applying the three values to
81
evaluate particular cases.
Each respective agency must have the initial choice to decide what type
of hearing procedure would be most suitable for handling grievances in their
area. Practical considerations, rather than judicial restraint, probably lead
the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge to say: "In assessing what
process is due in this case, substantial weight must be given to the goodfaith judgments of the individuals charged by Congress with the administration of social welfare programs that the procedures they have provided
assure fair consideration of the entitlement claims of individuals.' '82 The
judicial duty is to supervise, not preempt. In doing so, the reviewing court
must remember that it is dealing with "mass justice."8 3
The needs of mass justice contradict the instinct for requiring every
possible procedural safeguard in each individual case. Mass justice demands
justice for all individuals in the system. While courts and commentators talk
of the "government's interest," what they mean is the class' or general
social welfare's interest. Balancing fairness against efficiency becomes
serious business which cannot be resolved by a presumption in favor of the
individual. The result of such insensitivity to community interests will be
84
manifest injustice to perhaps millions of other individuals.
78. Verkuil, supra note 7, at 740. "Fairness implies procedural justice; efficiency, optimum resource allocation; and satisfaction, participant trust in the process." Id. at 740 n.4. See
also Cramton, A Comment on Trial-Type Hearingsin Nuclear Power Plant Siting, 58 VA. L.
REV. 585, 591-93 (1972).
79. See text accompanying notes 16-25 supra.
80. Concern for individual satisfaction in Social Security disability cases has undermined
the whole system. Hearings on Delays in Social Security Appeals Before the House Ways and
Means Committee, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 36-39 (1975); Mashaw, supra note 9, at 31 n.10. For a
discussion of the effect of such laws on the Utah Schools see Marquardt & Plenck, School
Suspension and the Right of Due Process: The Effect of Goss and Wood in Utah Schools, 3 J.
CONTEMP. LAW 85 (1976). Judge Friendly points out that the English consider the whole
development as one of over-judicialization of the administrative process. Friendly, supra note
6, at 1269.
81. Verkuil, supra note 7, at 740.
82. 424 U.S. at 349.
83. Verkuil, supra note 7, at 744.
84. See Note, Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on the
Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1510, 1523-27 (1975).
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Judge Friendly offers some guidance as to the hierarchy of seriousness
to the individual which will be of assistance in balancing individual fairness
against efficiency or group fairness. First, the actions may be divided
between those which change an individual's existing status and those which
deny a request for a benefit. The former represents a significantly higher
level of seriousness to the individual.8 5 He would then rank those actions
falling into the change in status category in order of seriousness: (1) actions
depriving an individual of liberty (e.g., parole revocation, civil commitment, deportation); (2) revocation of professional licenses; (3) termination
of public benefits (e.g., welfare, school, housing); and (4) reduction of
those public benefits. 8 6 Efforts to rank particular classes of informal adjudication according to such interests will create understanding leading to
87
awareness of the appropriate procedural ingredients.
Ranking the individual seriousness according to this interest hierarchy
offers some feeling for weighing the individual interest against that of the
public's interest. This valuation can be used to choose among the elements
of procedure. In evaluating the elements of procedure, Judge Friendly
places highest value on three elements: notice, opportunity to comment and
impartial decision-maker. 8 8 Notice, opportunity for at least written comment
and reasons may be a minimum for informal adjudication. 8 9 However, some
informal adjudication may not warrant even these exceedingly efficient
procedures. While Judge Friendly states that "[g]ood sense would suggest
that there must be some floor below which no hearing of any sort is
required,"' rare will be the instance where reasoned explanation cannot
and should not be provided by those exercising discretion. 91 At the very
least, agencies should provide findings and reasons 92 and open themselves
to post-decision reconsideration. 93 Judicial review should demand explana85. Friendly, supra note 6, at 1295-96. He cautioned that he does not intend by this
distinction to resurrect the right/privilege doctrine. Id. at 1295.
86. Id. at 1296-98.
87. Verkuil, supra note 7, at 747. He suggests procedural rule-making to create a forum by
which the agency could study the impact of its informal action. Id. at 747 n.31.
88. See Friendly, supra note 6, at 1279-81.
89. The "notice and comment" procedures of informal rule-making (5 U.S.C. § 553
(1970)) may provide the core ingredients for all informal action. Verkuil, supra note 7, at 750.
90. Friendly, supra note 6, at 1275.
91. Rabin, supra note 9, at 79-80. See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 571 (1975);
Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142-43 (1973); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402, 420 (1971). Cost and functional arguments which can be made against most procedures are rarely valid for the modest procedure of reason explanation. Rabin, supra note 9, at
89 n.98.
92. In some cases, merely completed forms will suffice.
93. See Hayes v. Walker, 555 F.2d 625, 633 (7th Cir. 1977). The fundamental due process
right may be "a reasoned explanation of government conduct that is contrary to the expectations the government has created." Rabin, supra note 9, at 77. The opinion in Hathaway
demonstrates how reasoned explanations can resolve issues efficiently. Hathaway v. Mathews,
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tion as the starting point. 94 Nonetheless, the presumption should be strongly
in favor of notice, comment and statement of findings and reasons.
Judge Friendly believes an impartial decision-maker may solve many
problems. 95 No one can quarrel with this conclusion, but in the mass justice
situation, there is no reason why the investigating officer himself will not be
impartial. His job is to assure that the benefits go to the eligible.9 6 He does
not have to pay the benefits, nor does his salary relate to whether benefits
are paid or not. Of course, different officials will have different philosophies
but mere separation of functions will not change that. The drive to go
outside the agency for the decision-maker may reflect a commitment to
appearance. The motivation of creating the appearance of fairness must not
cloud procedural determination in informal adjudication. Appearances often
come at too high a price.
Two recent Seventh Circuit cases, Allen v. Weinberger97 and Coppenbarger v. Federal Aviation Administration9 8 demonstrate an interesting
contrast in approaches to the concept of the impartial decision-maker. In
Allen, the court reviewed an HEW determination that the plaintiff was not
eligible for disability insurance benefits. In reaching that decision, both the
administrative law judge and the agency's Appeals Council based their
decisions on the opinions of agency medical specialists who relied on the
medical evidence in the record. The court virtually dismissed the opinions of
two agency doctors who had not examined the claimant. Without the
opinion of agency experts, the record contained only the favorable opinion
of the treating physician and, hence, the record did not contain sufficient
evidence to support the agency decision. The court correctly found that the
opinions of two agency experts, based only on the medical reports, were not
inadmissible hearsay. 99 Instead, it found that the opinions of the agency
experts must be disregarded for want of firsthand knowledge and that the
only reliable opinion was that of the treating physician even though he was
very likely to be biased. The court's mistake lay in classifying the opinions
of the agency experts as "evidence;" whereas, in fact, the experts' partici546 F.2d at 231 n.4 (7th Cir. 1976). For a discussion of Hathaway see text accompanying notes
57-69 supra.
94. Professor Rabin suggests a "limited standard of judicial review, providing an aggrieved individual with a judicial remedy when the agency fails to supply an explanation for its
decision that indicates clearly and in detail why the adverse determination has been reached."
Rabin, supra note 9, at 85.
95. See Friendly, supra note 6, at 1279.
96. See Verkuil, supra note 7, at 755. The adversary process is not preferred where
interests correspond, standards are clear and both sides see the value of efficiency. Id. at 75456.
97. 552 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1977).
98. 558 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1977).
99. 552 F.2d at 786.
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pation was part of the decision-making process not part of the information
gathering process.
In Coppenbarger,a different panel refused to disapprove of the Federal Aviation Administration's use of expert opinion which was not properly
introduced into evidence. The agency had denied a pilot certificate for
medical reasons. In doing so, the agency relied on the opinion of unnamed
consultants in neurology to evaluate the medical reports. The court found
that this expert opinion need not be presented as evidence and the experts
need not be made available for cross-examination: "[T]he Administrator's
purpose in retaining the experts was merely to obtain their help in evaluating
the data which petitioner had supplied. The Administrator was entitled to do
this, and petitioner had no more right to cross-examine the experts than he
had to cross-examine the Administrator himself."'1'0 Not only does the
approach in Coppenbargerseem more consistent with the Supreme Court's
pronouncement in the leading case of Richardson v. Perales'0 1 but it
evidences an understanding of decision-making in the administrative process. No one administrative official can obtain the knowledge which is
imputed to agency decision-makers as "expertise." Rather, in order to fill
the need for expertise, the administrative process permits the decisionmaker to freely make use of various experts. By doing so, an official has not
consulted extra-record evidence but rather has taken the necessary expert
into the decision-making process. Thus, as the Coppenbarger panel suggests, the experts and the presiding officials become interrelated parts of the
decision-making process. Of course, both must be impartial but the techniques for assuring impartiality are not necessarily the same as those used in
a trial to test witnesses.
Judge Friendly would rank such testimonial devices as the right to
know opposing evidence, to call witnesses,1 2 to cross-examine and to be
represented by counsel' 013 at a much lower level than impartial decisionmaking. 104 He would shift the emphasis to what he calls the "investigatory"

100. 558 F.2d at 840.
101. 402 U.S. 389, 408 (1971). In Perales, the Court held that written reports by physicians
constituted substantial evidence notwithstanding the reports' hearsay character, the absence of
cross-examination and the directly opposing testimony. The Court held that due process had
not been violated. Id. at 402.
102. In Hayes v. Walker, 555 F.2d 625, 629 (7th Cir. 1977), the Seventh Circuit recognized
substantial limits on the right to call witnesses in informal administrative proceedings. Nonetheless, the court found that "[d]ue process does not permit the automatic exclusion of the right to
call witnesses." Id.
103. An empirical study appears to value this element more highly. Verkuil, supra note 7,
at 750 (citing W. Popkin, REPORT FOR THE COMMITTEE ON GRANT AND BENEFIT PROGRAMS OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, JUNE 27, 1975 (unpublished final
draft)).
104. See Friendly, supra note 6, at 1278-91.
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model ' 5-scientific fact finding or information gathering. Impartial investigation might replace adversary methods. The investigatory process would
give the government officials power to inquire into the facts without limiting
the method of inquiry to the dialectic. Certainly, the best approach is not to
begin with full trial procedures and subtract certain elements. The best
approach is to begin with a minimum, perhaps notice, written comment and
statement of findings and reason, and add procedures.U° 6 Accuracy and
1 07
sensitivity to the relevant class must be the goals of the informal action.
Damage Liability for Denial of Due Process
Recently, the choice of an appropriate remedy has become complicated
by new law creating damage liability for due process violations. The sole
question in the Seventh Circuit case of Piphus v. Carey'0 8 was damage
liability. The case involved the twenty-day suspension of two public school
students. The district court found that the suspensions were ordered without
a hearing in violation of due process but ordered neither damages nor
equitable relief. The finding of due process violation was not raised on
appeal and, hence, the court of appeals had to decide only whether damages
could be assessed against either the individuals or the institution responsible
for deprivation without minimal due process. 10 Traditionally, the remedies
for this kind of due process violation are declaratory orders or injunctions.
However, the Supreme Court in Wood v. Strickland'10 opened the door to
damage liability. Since that case, the Seventh Circuit has been a force in the
development of the law.
Wood v. Strickland involved expulsion of three Arkansas high school
students for "spiking" punch. The suspension decision was made by the
school board at a meeting. The students were not present at the meeting nor
were they permitted any means of defending themselves. They brought a
section 1983 action.' claiming that their federal constitutional rights to due
process were infringed under color of state law. The amended complaints
asked not only for injunctive relief but also for compensatory and punitive
damages against the members of the school board, two school adminis105. Compare Friendly, supra note 6, at 1289-90 with Mashaw, supra note 9, at 53-54.
106. Gardner, supra note 8, at 163-64.
107. The case of Young v. Brashears, 560 F.2d 1337 (7th Cir. 1977), suggests an approach
to choosing the proper informal procedure. The case involved the removal of Dr. Quentin
Young as Clinical Director of the Department of Medicine at Cook County Hospital. After
finding entitlement which gave rise to a due process requirement of some kind of hearing, the
district court asked the parties to suggest just what elements of procedures were required in this
instance. The appellate court seemed to approve.
108. 545 F.2d 30 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 46 U.S.L.W. 4224 (Mar. 21, 1978) (76-1149).
109. d. at 31.
110. 420 U.S. 308 (1975). See generally Marquardt & Plenck, supra note 80.
111. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
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trators, and the school district. The major part of the opinion concerns
official immunity from section 1983 actions. The Supreme Court refused to
recognize absolute immunity for school officials. It did, however, find that
official discretionary actions were entitled to qualified, good faith immunity
from liability for damages. The Supreme Court expressed concern 'that the
threat of money damages would inhibit the school officials from furthering
educational needs and discourage competent people from entering school
administration. It found that absolute immunity was not necessary to assure
against these evils and "would deny much of the promise of section
1983.112 School administrators could be held to "a standard of conduct
based not only on permissible intentions, but also on knowledge of the
basic, unquestioned constitutional rights of his charges

.

,,1 The

Court stated:
[I]n the specific context of school discipline, we hold that a school
board member is not immune from liability for damages under §
1983 if he knew or reasonably should have known that the action
he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate
the constitutional rights of the student affected, or if he took the
action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation
of
4
constitutional rights or other injury to the student."
The Supreme Court conceded the emerging nature of the law with its caution
that school officials cannot be held to predict the future course of constitutional law.
In Piphus,"5 the district court found that the first test of Strickland was
met because the school officials "should have known that a lengthy suspension without any adjudicative hearing of any type would violate the constitu6 The key question, therefore, was not whether
tional rights of plaintiffs." 11
defendant officials were technically liable for damages but whether any
damages could be proved. The district court found no proof of actual
damages. The court of appeals found that non-punitive damages are recoverable for a violation of due process even if there is no proof of either
individual injury or pecuniary loss. The amount will depend on the nature of
the wrong. Thus, plaintiffs may be entitled to damages for deprivation of
due process rights even where no individual injury is shown and to special
damages based on the value of school days lost. But damages based on the
suspension itself may not be imposed if defendants can show that the
112. 420 U.S. at 322.
113. Id.
114. Id. The Court relied generally on Sheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974). In the
context of the Kent State killings, the court refused to find absolute official immunity. 416 U.S.
at 238-49.
115. 545 F.2d 30 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 46 U.S.L.W. 4224 (Mar. 21, 1978) (76-1149).
116. Id. at 31 n.2.
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plaintiffs would have been suspended even if a proper hearing had been
held. 117
In Hostrop v. Board of Junior College DistrictNo. 515,1 18 Judge Tone
had constructed a firm foundation for the proposition that failure to provide
necessary due process might give rise to damages unrelated to the possible
outcome of the hearing.' 19 This leading case for due process-related-damages involved alleged wrongful termination of the employment of a former
president of a public junior college. The Seventh Circuit held that he should
have been afforded a hearing and, hence, was entitled to damages against
the Board but not the individual members. The court found that the plaintiff
had a legitimate claim of entitlement which could not be denied without a
hearing because the Board's regulations "in fact" established a tenure
policy. 120 The circuit court did not subject the individual members to
21
damage liability because it found them protected by official immunity.'
With respect to the Board as an institution, however, the court held that
damages were appropriate. 12 2 The court agreed that plaintiff would have
been terminated after a full hearing, but found that plaintiff was nonetheless
entitled to damages for violations of due process rights. 123 The court granted
"recovery of non-punitive damages for the deprivation of intangible rights
for which no pecuniary loss can be shown." 124 The factors to be considered
in measuring such ephemeral damages include "the nature of the constitutional deprivation and the magnitude of the mental distress and humiliation
25
suffered by the plaintiff." 1
When an Agency May Choose Informal Adjudication
While judicially created law may mandate some formalized procedures
in informal adjudication, statutory language settles the question of whether
the agency is free to proceed by informal procedures. In United States Steel
Corp. v. Train, 126 the Seventh Circuit was forced to determine when, in the
absence of clear statutory mandate, an agency must proceed by formal trial-

117. Id. at 32. Equitable relief, declaratory and injunctive, should not depend on whether
plaintiffs would have been suspended in any event.
118. 523 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 (1976).
119. Id. at 579.
120. Id. at 575-76.
121. Id. at 578.
122. Id. at 577. The government, rather than employees, should be liable. The victim of
official misconduct will be compensated without making government officials even more timid.
DAVIS SEVENTIES, supra note 2, at 597.
123. 523 F.2d at 579.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 580.
126. 556 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1977).
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type adjudicatory procedures. The case arose from the steel company's
challenge to the conditions placed on a discharge permit granted by the
United States Environmental Protection Agency. 127 The bulk of the case
involves complicated questions of fact and several other procedural issues. 128 The major administrative procedural issue was whether section 554
of the Administrative Procedure Act 29 required formal adjudicatory procedures.
The APA prescribes formal procedure, for both rule-making and adjudication, where either is "required by statute to be determined on the
record after opportunity for an agency hearing." 1 30 The key phrase is not the
requirement of agency hearing but that the statute requires the decision to be
made "on the record." The term "hearing" in administrative law has a
myriad of meanings from full trial to mere written comment. 131 Thus,
Congress does not necessarily intend to require trial-type procedures merely
by providing for a "hearing" or even a "full hearing."
Strict construction of the phrase "on the record after opportunity for an
agency hearing"' 32 in rule-making proceedings was suggested by the Supreme Court opinion in United States v. FloridaEast Coast Ry. Co. 133 That
case involved the language of section 1(14)(a) of the Interstate Commerce
Act "34
' which stated that "[t]he Commission may, after hearing . . . establish reasonable rules."' 35 The Court held that this language was not sufficient to compel trial-type rule-making. The Court read the activating language in section 553 of the APA 36 very strictly in reliance on its prior
opinion in United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp. 137 While conceding that words other than "required by statute to be determined on the record
after opportunity for an agency hearing" may activate the formal procedural
requirement, the Court left little room for variation in language.

127. Hereinafter referred to as the EPA.
128. The court found that because the Company was the proponent of the permit order, it
could be required to bear the burden under 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1970). And because 5 U.S.C. §
554(d)(A) (1970) exempts "applications for initial licenses" from 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1970) and 5
U.S.C. § 557(b)(1970), the hearing officer may certify the record without rendering an initial
decision. 556 F.2d at 834.
129. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1970). [Hereinafter the Administrative Procedure Act will be referred
to as the APA].
130. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1970) (rule-making); 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1970) (adjudication).
131. Friendly, supra note 6, at 1270; but see K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TExT 157 n. I
(3d ed. 1972) and DAVIS SuPP. 1970, supra note 2, at § 7.01.
132. 5 U.S.C. § 1(14)(a) (1970).
133. 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
134. 49 U.S.C. § 1(14)(a) (1970).
135. Id.
136. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
137. 406 U.S. 742 (1972).
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However, in Florida East Coast Ry., the Supreme Court drew a
distinction between rule-making and adjudication. The railroads argued,
relying on Morgan and Louisville, 138 that the words "hearing" or "full
hearing" compelled the trial procedures as surely as the words contained in
the APA. The Supreme Court found that these cases applied only to "quasijudicial" proceedings, i.e. formal adjudicative determinations, and not to
rule-making. 139 Adjudication, it implied, might be treated differently and
the strict construction given the key phrase may not be appropriate in an
adjudicative context. 14
The Seventh Circuit's holding in Train that a formal proceeding was
required 141 seems consistent with the approach of treating adjudication
differently than rule-making that was suggested by the Supreme Court. In
Train, the court was required to decide whether formal procedures were
necessary in an adjudicative setting. The statute in question provided that
"the Administrator may, after opportunity for public hearing, issue a permit
for the discharge of any pollutant ... 142 and did not contain the words
"on the record." The court felt that the absence of the words "on the
record" was not conclusive and, hence, it went behind the language in order
to determine the full extent of the hearing provision. It was troubled by the
fact that Congress had used the magic words in other sections of the statute.
This fact suggests that Congress knew how to provide for formal hearing
when it was so inclined. 143 However, it found this statutory construction
consideration outweighed by its finding of congressional intent. 144
The court found some support for requiring formal adjudicative procedures in the provision for judicial review. Little force can be given to the
court's concern for judicial review, however, because the provision for
judicial review does not necessarily require any particular kind of recordmaking procedures. 145 Certainly, it does not require a formal record
compiled through formal adjudication. Courts can, and have, in fact,
conducted review on a "written record" which was not a formal, evidentiary record. 1
138. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1(1938) (Morgan II); ICC v. Louisville & Nashville
Ry. Co., 227 U.S. 88 (1913).
139. Contra, Nathanson, Probing the Minds of the Administrator: Hearing Variationsand
Standards of Judical Review Under the Administrative Procedure Act and Other Federal
Statutes, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 721, 731-33 (1975). (Professor Nathanson reads the legislative
history of the APA, in light of these two cases, as supporting the railroad's position).
140. 410 U.S. at 244-45.
141. 556 F.2d at 836-37.
142. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (Supp. 11 1972).
143. 556 F.2d at 833.
144. Id.
145. See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 140-42 (1973).
146. E.g., United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
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The court primarily relied on a close, common sense reading of section
509 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. 4'7 That section suggests that
Congress did not intend to provide for disparate forms of adjudication.
Subsection (c) provides for review of "any judicial proceeding brought
under subsection (b) of this section," which must be made "on the
record." '48 Since both section 402 of the FWPCA, 149 the section at issue,
and section 307 of the FWPCA,1 50 which contains "on the record" language, are listed in subsection (b), both must be covered by the "on the
record" language which activates APA section 554151 formal procedures if
disparate forms of adjudication are to be avoided.
As an additional argument, the Seventh Circuit supported its conclusion by looking to the scope of review. The court found that licensing
decisions such as the one at issue require APA sections 556152 and 557153
procedures and hence APA section 706(2)(E) 5 4 imposed "substantial evidence" review. Substantial evidence review must by definition be made on
a formal record: evidentiary review is impossible on an informal record
because there is no evidence. 55 Thus, the imposition of "substantive
evidence" review requires formal adjudication in order to build the evidentiary record which will permit the court to conduct such review. 156
These semantic conclusions, however, probably were not the motivating force behind the decision. The court leaned in this direction basically
because it was confronted with adjudication, not some other agency action
such as rule-making where the traditional mode of proceeding is not trial.
Trial-type procedures seemed appropriate where adjudication was involved.
The court also examined the practical impact trial-type procedures
would have on the EPA's ability to protect the environment.1 57 The court
147. 33 U.S.C. § 1369 (Supp. 11 1972) [hereinafter referred to as FWPCA].
148. 33 U.S.C. § 1369 (Supp. 11 1972).
149. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (Supp. 11 1972).
150. 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1974).
151. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1970).
152. 5 U.S.C. § 556 (1970).
153. 5 U.S.C. § 557 (1970).
154. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1970) provides in part:
The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and
conclusions found to be . . .unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to
sections 556 and 557 of this title [5) or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency
hearing provided by statute.
155. Of course, review is possible under arbitrary, capricious or abuse of discretion
standards. Where the adjudicative procedure will not result in an adequate record, the court
may conduct de novo review. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415

(1971).
156. For a full development of this logic see Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1249-63
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (the court used similar analysis to require some trial procedures even where
formal rule-making was prescribed by statute).
157. 556 F.2d at 834.
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concluded that although trial procedures in all permit situations would
render the process practically impossible, the few instances in which a
hearing is actually requested is not beyond the practical limit. Implicit in this
examination, however, is the court's insistence on weighing the practical
implications, at least where the congressional mandate of formal procedures
is unclear, before compelling such procedure.
CONSISTENCY AS A LIMIT ON DISCRETION

Another way to confine discretion is to force agencies either to be
consistent' 58 or to explain why they are not. The question of consistency
most often arises in the context of both adjudicatively created precedent and
agency commitment to its own rules.
Consistency in informal adjudicative decisions is an important factor in
the fairness of those decisions. Nonetheless, compelling an agency to be
consistent in their adjudicative decisions will not always result in fairness
and justice, especially where discretion is intentionally delegated. Some59
times individualizing requires that the agency deviate from precedent.
Moreover, practicality rules out a system whereby the decision-makers must
be consistent with massive numbers of rulings.160 In mass justice systems,
keeping current with all of the millions of agency rulings is impossible.
Consequently, courts cannot require complete consistency and must tolerate
some, perhaps much, inconsistency, but courts can require "(a) that administrators must strive for consistency, (b) that they must consider their
own precedents when doing so is feasible, and (c) that when administrators
depart from their own precedents they must normally explain why they
do." 16 1 The latter is the most important concept. While fairness often
requires individualizing rather than consistency, the agency should formulate and disclose the reason for inconsistency.
In Hilt Truck Line, Inc. v. United States,162 the Seventh Circuit
rejected the agency decision because the Interstate Commerce Commission' 63 deviated from a long series of agency precedent. The case involved
an appeal from the ICC's restriction on authorized operating rights purchased from another carrier. The ICC found that dormancy, or failure to
provide service, withdrew operating authority in some counties in Illinois,
158. K. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 106-07 (1969); See B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 33-34 (1921). But see L. Jaffe, JUDICAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
586-87 (1965).
159. K. DAVIS, supra note 1,at 21, 107; see Sofaer, supra note 4, at 1354.
160. Sofaer, supra note 4, at 1353-54.
161. DAVIS SEVENTIES, supra note 2, at 412.
162. 548 F.2d 214 (7th Cir. 1977).
163. Hereinafter referred to in the text as the ICC or the Commission.
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ignoring prior decisions in which the Commission had consistently held that
harm to protesting carriers is a necessary prerequisite to a finding of
dormancy.' 64 Since the Commission adopted the Administrative Law
Judge's 165 finding of an absence of harm, the court held that "[t]he
Commission cannot disregard its own precedents but must reasonably explain an alternation [sic] of policy." 166 The court confined discretion by
requiring uniformity unless sound reasons for modification are
articulated. 167
Although courts will give great deference to an agency's interpretation
of its own rules, 168 they will not permit an agency to fail to follow its
rules, 169 at least without giving reasons for doing so. Here also, justice may
demand that an agency should individualize rather than blindly follow its
own rules. As in adjudication, fairness compels a balance between consistency and individualizing.
The Seventh Circuit, in Cox v. Benson,1 70 carefully examined whether
the parole rules should apply to petitioners. Petitioner sought habeas corpus
in the district court to question denial of parole by the parole board's
national appellate board. He claimed that the board failed to follow its own
regulation and applied the regulation in violation of due process. The
appellate board on its own motion had reversed the examiner's favorable
decision and denied parole. The board's action was based on a guideline
provision which, due to the severity of the offense, placed petitioner in the
highest category of punishment. Petitioner argued that the guidelines were
arbitrarily applied to him. He received a favorable case worker report on his
fitness to re-enter society and he had not been given an opportunity to refute
the unproven facts under which he was characterized. The court held that the
board arbitrarily applied the guidelines to petitioner. The court found support for this decision in the board's failure to proceed according to its own
procedural regulation. 171
164. 548 F.2d at 215.
165. Hereinafter referred to as the ALJ.
166. 548 F.2d at 216 (citing both Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852
(D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971) and National Ass'n of Food Chains, Inc. v.
ICC, 535 F.2d 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
167. See Friendly, Judicial Control of Discretionary Administrative Action, 23 J. LEGAL
ED. 63, 65 (1970).
168. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). But see FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S.
726, 745 (1973); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Ford Motor Co., 390 U.S. 261, 272,
modified on other grounds, 392 U.S. 901 (1968).
169. United States v. Pennsylvania Ind. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 673-75 (1973); Vitarelli
v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 539-40 (1959); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 373-76 (1957); United
States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 265-68 (1954). See generally Berger, Do
Regulations Really Bind Regulators?, 62 Nw. U.L. REV. 137 (1967).
170. 548 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1977).
171. Id. at 189. Judge Fairchild was more receptive to the Board's discretion to deny parole
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In another denial of parole based on severity of the offense, Garcia v.
United States Board of Parole,'72 the petitioner challenged application of
the rule. Garcia pleaded guilty to charges stemming from his involvement in
the bombing of several retail shops in Chicago. He was denied parole based
on the Board's guidelines. The severity of the offense led the Board to find
that his release would depreciate the gravity of the offense and would be
incompatible with the welfare of society. At the first review, the district
court ordered a new parole hearing because the Board's reasons were not
specific enough. 17 3 In this second consideration, the district court granted
habeas corpus, finding the reasons still insufficient. The Seventh Circuit
reversed and remanded. 174 It recognized that minimum due process included
a statement of reasons for denying parole. To be acceptable in parole cases,
reasons must be sufficient for review; detailed findings of facts are not
required so long as the reasons evidence consideration of all relevant factors
and furnish essential facts and the grounds for the decision. The board is not
required to issue an opinion supporting its decision. 175 The court found that
the reasons here met this standard. It noted that, although the board applied
the guidelines, it did not do so blindly. The court was convinced that the
Board undertook sufficient consideration of individual circumstances. The
board considered the actual gravity of the offense and did not resort to mere
76
definitional application of the language of the guidelines. 1
An agency's interpretation or application cannot bend the language of
its regulation beyond natural meaning. In Amoco Oil Co. v. Occupational
Safety & Health Review Commission,'177 the court considered an attempt by
the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission to include petitioner's shop storage dispensing tank under a regulation for "service stations." The court needed only to consult ordinary dictionaries in finding that
the interpretation strained beyond the breaking point. It found that the
Commission could have prohibited the petitioner's above ground dispensing
tank, but it did not do so. 178 An agency cannot cover its mistakes by
misinterpreting the language of its guidelines.
CONFINING DISCRETION THROUGH REQUIRED RULE-MAKING

The Seventh Circuit was one of the first in the federal judiciary to
"based on the egregious nature of the offense." !d. at 192. He concurred in requiring the Board
to find the necessary facts in exercising that discretion. Id.
172. 557 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1977).
173. 409 F. Supp. 1230, 1239-40 (N.D. I11.1976).
174. 557 F.2d at 107.
175. Id. at 105.
176. Id. at 106.
177. 549 F.2d I(7th Cir. 1976).
178. Id. at 2.
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recognize the utility of judicially required rule-making as a technique for
79
confining administrative discretion. Recently, in Mandley v. Trainor, the
circuit gave further impetus to the concept of judicially required rule80
making.'
The foundation case for judicially required rule-making, Holmes v.
New York City Housing Authority, 18 1 held that the City Housing Authority
must allocate scarce public housing in accordance with "ascertainable
183
standards."' 182 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit in Soglin v. Kauffman
found the absence of adequate administrative standards fatal to administrative action. I8 Other Seventh Circuit opinions evidence recognition of the
potential for judicially required rule-making as a device for confining
discretion. 185

This concept of judicially required rule-making is gaining acceptance
throughout the federal court system and in some states. 8 6 Its most ardent
promoter has been Professor Kenneth Davis. The concept largely emanates
from Professor Davis' seminal work on discretionary justice' 8 7 and has been
nurtured by him ever since. 188 Professor Davis offers a choice of four
rationales which can support a judicial mandate of rule-making.' 89 The first
is the due process technique suggested by the Holmes and Soglin decisions. 19 The second reformulates and revitalizes the discredited nondelegation doctrine. 191 The third uses the "void for vagueness" doctrine to suggest
that administrative action may be saved even if based on a vague statute if
agency regulation adequately fills in the detail. 19 2 The fourth simply looks to
the common law process to develop judicially created law compelling rule94
making in certain situations.193 Professor Davis prefers the last rationale
179. 545 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir. 1976).
180. See text accompanying notes 218-23 infra.
181. 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1968).
182. Id.
183. 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969).
184. Id. at 168.
185. See, e.g., Morales v. Schmidt, 494 F.2d 85, 87-88 (7th Cir. 1974).
186. The Administrative Conference has long looked to rule-making as a technique for
limiting discretion. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION I C.F.R. § 305.71-3
(1977); Gardner, supra note 8, at 159.
187. DAVIS, supra note 1. Closely related points were made inJudge Friendly's lectures on
the Holmes case. Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for Better Definition of Standards pts. 1-3, 75 HARV. L. REV. 863, 1055, 1263 (1962).
188. See DAVIS SEVENTIES, supra note 2, at §§ 2.00-2.04, 2.17, 4.00-4.20, 6.13, 17.07; DAVIS
Supp. 1970, supra note 2, at §§ 1.04-8, 1.04-13, 4.13-22; Davis, A New Approach to Delegation,
36 U. CHI. L. REV. 713 (1969).
189. DAVIS SEVENTIES, supra note 2, at § 6.13. See also Clagett, supra note 3, at 64-65
(discussing the rationales for judicially required rule-making).
190. See text accompanying notes 195-97 infra.
191. See text accompanying notes 199-206 infra.
192. See text accompanying notes 207-08 infra.
193. See text accompanying notes 209-16 infra.
194. DAVIS SEVENTIES, supra note 2, at § 6.13-1.
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and the Seventh Circuit opinion in Mandley v. Trainoris another step in the
development of such law in the Seventh Circuit.
The penumbral due process doctrine is the first of the constitutional
notions which will support required rule-making. Professor Davis,1 95 supported by Judge J. Skelly Wright, 96 suggests that due process might require
rule-making in some situations. Judge Wright argues that due process
includes the right to have one's conduct judged by known standards; without
standards there is no law. 1 97 This is the theory of the leading Holmes
case. 198
The second rationale for required rule-making, the non-delegation
doctrine, also looks to the evils of standardless power-power without
boundaries. This fear has always supported the non-delegation doctrine.
Briefly, the non-delegation doctrine questions the legality of delegation of
"legislative" authority to the executive branch or administrative agencies.
The practical weakness of the doctrine led to retreat from absolute prohibition against the delegation of "legislative" functions.' 99 The first step in the
retreat was to permit such delegation with clear standards. The practical
impossibility of precise legislative standards led to gradual acceptance of
vague, general standards. At present, the vitality of the requirement of
legislative standards is questionable. Under current theory, the permissible
limits of delegation are very broad. 200 By 1970, Professor Davis was
prepared to say that "[t]he non-delegation doctrine is almost a complete
failure .

.

.

. The time has come for the courts to acknowledge that the

•. doctrine is unsatisfactory and to invent better ways to protect against
arbitrary administrative power. "201
195. DAVIS SuPP. 1970, supra note 2, at § 2.00-6; DAVIS SEVENTIES, supra note 2, at § 6.13.
196. Wright, Book Review, 81 YALE L.J. 575, 588 (1972).
197. Id. at 588-89.
198. 398 F.2d at 265. In that case, the Fifth Circuit was driven toward a due process
requirement of administrative standards because it feared that power without standards to
govern its exercise is "an intolerable invitation to abuse." Id. The court recognized that there
was not enough public housing to satisfy all eligible applicants and, hence, that agency
compliance with its statutory mandate was physically impossible. The court had to fashion a
remedy which complied with due process and yet solved the difficult problem of choosing who
would be favored among eligible applicants. The only remedy which made sense involved

forcing the agency to allocate the scarce housing by some unbiased process. To solve this
practical problem, the court required the agency to articulate the standards by which it would

dispense housing.
199. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935); Schechter Poultry Corp. v.

United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
200. Leventhal, Principled Fairness and Regulatory Urgency, 25 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 66,
70 (1974).

201. DAvIS SuPP. 1970, supra note 2, at § 2.00. Contra, Wright, supra note 196, at 582
("the reported demise of the delegation doctrine is a bit premature."). The Seventh Circuit in
Penn-Dixie Steel Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm 'n, 553.F.2d 1078 (7th

Cir. 1977) found that Congress could delgate adjudicative authority in cases regarding OSHA

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

One of the "better ways" is required rule-making. To require rulemaking, the non-delegation doctrine need only be "reformulated. 2 2
Though standards will be required, the standards can be provided by the
agency. Rather than striking down legislation which has insufficient standards, the doctrine will be used to compel agencies to fill in the details with
more definite standards.20 3 Indeed, administrative standards may often be
20 4
preferable to legislative standards.
This rationale has two fundamental weaknesses, one practical and the
other theoretical. 20 5 The practical weakness stems from the potential danger
that rigid application of this abstract principle will eliminate necessary
flexibility. The theoretical weakness runs from the general principle that if
Congress, under the doctrine of separation of powers, cannot delegate
legislative functions, then nothing the agency does can save the unconstitutional delegation.20 6 Neither of these weaknesses is compelling. As long as
the need for discretion is recognized, the required standards will leave room
for individualizing and, since the doctrine is a judicial creation, its theoretical parameters can be changed by the courts.
The third rationale looks to the general prohibition against vagueness.
Required rule-making offers an alternative to striking down a statute as too
vague; required rule-making may be used to force the responsible agency to
give definition to overtly vague statutory provisions. Professor Davis
contends that the Supreme Court suggests this idea in Papachristou v.
Jacksonville.2° 7 If the vagueness is impermissible because it permits and
encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law, then the
20 8
remedy need not be so drastic as to void the statute.
Of the four rationales, common law development offers the simplest
and most straight-forward support for required rule-making. The above
three rationales emanate from constitutional interpretations. While the
Constitution structures our law, it is not the primary source of movement in
violation even though penalties were involved. The question of standards was not mentioned.
Relying on Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm 'n, 97 S.Ct. 1261
(1977) the court found that the seventh amendment did not require trial by jury in such penalty
adjudication. 553 F.2d at 1080-81.
202. DAVIS SEVENTIES, supra note 2, at 224-25.
203. Thomforde, Controlling Administrative Sanctions, 74 MICH. L. REV. 709, 736-37
(1976).
204. DAVIS SuPP. 1970, supra note 2, at §§ 4.14-4.17.
205. Thomforde, supra note 203, at 736-38.
206. Professor Sofaer suggests the opposite as a theoretical objection to required rulemaking. If the legislature delegates discretion, the agency cannot avoid the delegation by
establishing rules. Sofaer, supra note 3, at 1319-31.
207. 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
208. DAVIS SEVENTIES, supra note 2, at 24-25. Other than to support required rule-making,
"void for vagueness" offers little promise in inhibiting virtually unlimited grants of discretion
in noncriminal matters. Clagett, supra note 4, at 55 n.7.
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the law. Our system depends on judicial development. Too often, in recent
times, we ignore common law development as support for new legal
concepts. Everything need not start with a constitutional base. 2°9 Greater
flexibility and greater opportunity for experimentation result from the evolutionary, common law process.
The most influential case leading to such common law development is
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus.21° The Court held:
"Judicial review must operate to ensure that the administrative process itself
will confine and control the exercise of discretion. Courts should require
administrative officers to articulate the standards and principles that govern
their discretionary decisions in as much detail as possible." 211 The Environmental Defense Fund, an organization engaged in activities related to
environmental protection, asked for suspension of registration for any pesticides using DDT. The opinion suggested that, although discretionary
power was vested in the agency, its exercise was reviewable for abuse of
discretion under section 706(2)(A) of the APA. 212 One of the ways abuse of
discretion review can confine and control delegated discretion is by compelling administrative officers to articulate standards.
While serving on the Seventh Circuit appellate panel, Justice Stevens
made a valuable contribution to the common law evolution of required rulemaking. 213 The views of then Judge Stevens were expressed in a dissent
from a remand in Morales v. Schmidt. 2 14 The majority found the key
question to be whether the prison's limitation on prisoners' rights to correspond was related to a legitimate rehabilitation purpose. Judge Stevens
noted that the prohibition was not supported by a regulation, and would
place a heavier burden of justification in the case of ad hoc determinations
"[i]n view of the risks of error inherent in an ad hoc determination,
unsupported either by preformulated guidelines or by a more complete
exposition of the reasons why less drastic alternatives could not be equally
effective ....
"1215 Thus, especially where individual rights are in danger,
an agency should by rules define the exercise of its discretion. Where it can
do so but does not, it increases its burden of persuasion in explaining its ad
hoc discretionary action. 216 Judicial review can thereby add incentive for
209. See Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280, 283 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting);
D'Oench Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447,470-72 (1942) (Jackson, J.,
concurring); accord, Friendly, supra note 6, at 1301-02.
210. 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
211. Id. at 598.
212. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).
213. DAVIS SEVENTIES, supra note 2, at 226-27.
214. 489 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir. 1973).
215. Id. at 1349.
216. As Professor Davis points out, the requirement of findings and reasons is interlocked
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agencies to make rules which confine their discretion.
The more often those challenging agency action ask the court to require
rules and the more often the courts reject the exercise of discretion without
standards, the more the law will evolve. Already numerous courts have
utilized this remedy. 217 One such case is the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Mandley v. Trainor.218 That case involved a second review of the Illinois
implementation of the Emergency Assistance Program. 21 9 Part of the proposed final judgment ordered HEW to file a regulation with the district
court. HEW contended that the district court could not order the adoption of
a particular rule. The Seventh Circuit found that the promulgation of rules
implementing the Social Security Act is mandatory. 221 Consequently, the
court found that the ordered rule-making was consistent with legislative
intent.
Perhaps, the court put too much emphasis on statutory construction.
Statutory language should not be read to compel agencies to proceed first by
rule-making before it can take other appropriate action. 221 Agencies must
have the discretion to choose how to attack a regulatory problem. While the
discretion should not be unbridled, the propriety of the discretionary choice
must be judged according to the needs of specific situations and not statutory
construction. Only the cleanest legislative intention to narrow the method of
proceeding should compel a court to narrow such discretion solely upon the
statutory language. Nonetheless, a court should require rule-making where
circumstances surrounding a specific regulatory problem demand such action. Under the circumstances of Mandley, the agency should have used
rule-making and the district court quite properly required it to do so.
Mandley continues the line of cases establishing required rule-making as an
appropriate remedy in the Seventh Circuit.22 2
The Seventh Circuit agreed with the HEW that a district court could not
with the requirement of rules. The requirement of reasons is itself a valuable tool for confining
and controlling discretion. See text accompanying notes 187-94 supra.
217. DAVIS SEVENTIES, supra note 2, at 227-29. Even the alleged absolute discretion of
prosecutors and police may be confined by administrative rule-making. E.g., McGowan, Rulemaking and the Police, 70 MICH. L. REV. 659 (1972); Abrams, InternalPolicy: Guiding the
Exercise of ProsecutorialDiscretion, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1 (1971); K. DAVIS, supra note 1, at
162-214.
218. 545 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir. 1976).
219. Mandley v. Trainor, 523 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1975).
220. 545 F.2d at 1072 (citing Kingsbrook Jewish Medical Center v. Richardson, 486 F.2d
663 (2nd Cir. 1973)).
221. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294-95 (1974); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332
U.S. 194, 201-02 (1974).
222. The case of Mystik Tape v. Pollution Control Bd., 16 I11.App. 3d 778,306 N.E.2d 574
(1973), modified on other grounds, 60 III. 2d 330, 328 N.E.2d 5 (1975), is state authority within
the Seventh Circuit for required rule-making. See also Doyle v. Board of Review, 31 111. App.
3d 968, 334 N.E.2d 776 (1975).
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mandate specific provisions of rules. While strongly urging the inclusion of
certain items, the court modified the proposed final judgment so that it
would "not order HEW specifically to include any items in its new regulation." 22 3 Although it is unlikely that HEW would decline such an invitation,
proper allocation of functions demands that courts not infringe too far into
the substance of administrative decisions. The doctrine of required rulemaking must not displace the agencies from their delegated functions.
A court must be extremely careful in its determination to interfere with
decision-making allocated to the agency by the legislature. The development of the required rule-making remedy demands a careful weighing of
costs and benefits. Courts and commentators often overlook the double
values inherent in the required rule-making effort. Required rule-making
aims to compel agencies to formulate and disclose policy. It may also focus
on the question whether an agency should use notice and comment procedures to develop policy or may make general policy through other processes
which do not permit general public participation. For example, the NLRB's
much criticized "Excelsior rule" 224 was promulgated in a formal adjudicative setting. A plurality of the Supreme Court disapproved of such rulemaking because it did not utilize the general public procedures of the
APA. 225 However, the "Excelsior rule" was a laudable effort in the direction of clarifying and disclosing policy; the procedures the NLRB should
have used is another, distinct question. Indeed, furtherance of the second
value, public participation in agency policymaking, may work against the
first value, encouraging public disclosure of policy, by increasing the
burden on the agency when it chooses to disclose policy.226 Of course, both
values are important and courts should require or encourage agencies both to
disclose policy and to utilize public procedures. Nonetheless, many times
policy can be announced without resort to APA procedure. Procedures less
burdensome than notice and comment may be used to announce policy in the
form of non-legislative rules. 227 Adjudication may be, and traditionally has
been, an appropriate means for developing policy. 228 Consequently, a court
which is inclined to require rule-making must consider two separate ques223. 545 F.2d at 1073.
224. Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966).
225. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 763-65 (1969). The Court was correct in
approving the NLRB's decision because the agency had reached an entirely new determination
in the Wyman-Gordon case without relying on the rule. The decision took the form of a de novo
consideration and resulted in an order having its own force, totally independent of the rule.
Hence, any deficiency in the rulemaking was irrelevant to the case presented to the Supreme

Court.
226. Koch, Public Procedures for the Promulgation of Interpretative Rules and General
Statements of Policy, 64 GEo. L.J. 1047, 1073-74 (1976).

227. Id. at 1075.
228. Clagett, supra note 4, at 83, 86. See generally Sofaer, supra note 4, at 1314-19.
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tions: first, should the agency be required to create public policy before it
can act; and second, should the agency be compelled to do so through public
procedures, either notice and comment procedures for legislative rules or
some variety of public procedures for non-legislative rules.

CONCLUSION

The administrative process is as old as the United States: the first
session of the First Congress enacted three statutes conferring significant
administrative powers and eleven important administrative agencies were in
existence prior to the close of the Civil War. The development of administrative agencies results from responses to practical problems and, hence, the
growth of administrative process concepts has proceeded along pragmatic
lines. Great damage would be done to the utility of the administrative
process if judicial doctrines were to ignore this pragmatic, problem-solving
orientation.
In the Seventies, we have embarked on many ventures to improve the
process of government. Many of those, though well meaning, have been
disastrous to the ability of the government to serve its citizens. Those who
have looked most frequently to the government to solve social problems
have also lead the fight to disable the government from doing so. Administrative law must find ways to reconcile these two movements.
The answers may lie in the careful thinking that has been done in
confining and controlling administrative discretion. The best of this thinking
has recognized the practical problems and has set forth principles which can
reform administrative decision-protecting the citizen from harmful government action-without preventing the government from functioning for the
benefit of its citizens. The government does not exist of its own force; it
exists only through the force of the needs of its citizens. Government
functions which do not serve the citizens should be eliminated, not reformed. Where the government process serves the citizens, reform must avoid
transforming a necessary function into a useless one.
This article has discussed some of the efforts to reconcile these competing values in the Seventh Circuit and other jurisdictions. Seventh Circuit
efforts have often been sophisticated and the circuit remains a leader in the
search for discretionary justice.

